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Bioterrorism and its potential for mass
destruction have been subjects of increasing
international concern. Approximately 17 countries
(including five implicated as sponsors of interna-
tional terrorism) may have active research and
development programs for biologic weapons (1).
Moreover, groups and individuals with grievances
against the government or society have been
known to use or plan to use biologic weapons to
further personal causes.
Only modest microbiologic skills are needed
to produce and effectively use biologic weapons.
The greatest, but not insurmountable, hurdle in
such an endeavor may be gaining access to a viru-
lent strain of the desired agent. Production costs
are low, and aerosol dispersal equipment from
commercial sources can be adapted for biologic
weapon dissemination. Bioterrorists operating in
a civilian environment have relative freedom of
movement, which could allow them to use freshly
grown microbial suspensions (storage reduces
viability and virulence). Moreover, bioterrorists
may not be constrained by the need for precise
targeting or predictable results.
The impact of a bioterrorist attack depends
on the specific agent or toxin used, the method
and efficiency of dispersal, the population exposed,
the level of immunity in the population, the
availability of effective postexposure and/or thera-
peutic regimens, and the potential for secondary
transmission. Understanding and quantifying the
impact of a bioterrorist attack are essential to
developing an effective response. Therefore, we
have analyzed the comparative impact of three
classic biologic warfare agents (Bacillus anthracis,
Brucella melitensis, and Francisella tularensis)
when released as aerosols in the suburbs of a
major city and compared the benefits of
systematic intervention with the costs of
increased disease incidence (from the economic
point of view used in society).
Analytic Approach
Scenario Assumptions
We compared the impact of a theoretical
bioterrorist attack on a suburb of a major city,
with 100,000 population exposed in the target
area. The attack was made by generating an
aerosol of an agent (B. anthracis spores, B.
melitensis, or F. tularensis) along a line across
the direction of the prevailing wind. The meteoro-
logic conditions (thermal stability, relative humidity,
wind direction and speed) were assumed to be
optimal (2), and the aerosol cloud passed over the
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target area within 2 hours. We projected impact
on the basis of 10% and 100% of the target
population being exposed to the aerosol cloud.
We assumed that, when inhaled, the infectious
dose50 (ID50) was 20,000 spores for B. anthracis
and 1,000 vegetative cells for B. melitensis and
F. tularensis. The rate of physical decay for air-
borne particles 5 mm or less in diameter was
estimated to be negligible during the 2-hour transit
time. The rate of biologic decay of the particulate
agents was estimated to  be negligible for  the
B. anthracis spores and 2% per minute for the
B. melitensis and F. tularensis vegetative cells.
Viability and virulence did not dissociate. Persons
who were exposed to the B. anthracis cloud at any
point during the 2-hour transit time inhaled one
ID50 dose, and persons who were exposed to either
the B. melitensis or F. tularensis cloud inhaled one
to 10 ID50 doses, depending on their proximity to
the origination point of the aerosol cloud.
The epidemic curve for anthrax by days after
exposure was assumed to be <1 day, 0% of cases;
1 day, 5%; 2 days, 20%; 3 days, 35%; 4 days, 20%;
5 days, 10%; 6 days, 5%; and 7 or more days, 5%
(3-5). Case-fatality rates were also assumed to
vary by the day symptoms were first noted. The
case-fatality rate was estimated as 85% for patients
with symptoms on day 1; 80% for patients with
symptoms on day 2; 70% for those with symptoms
on day 3; 50% for those with symptoms on days 4,
5, and 6; and 70% for those with symptoms on and
after day 7. The increased death rate in persons
with an incubation period of 7 or more days is
calculated on an assumption of delayed diag-
nosis, with resultant delayed therapy.
When estimating days in hospital and out-
patient visits due to infection, we assumed that
95% of anthrax patients were hospitalized, with a
mean stay of 7 days. Patients not admitted to a
hospital had an average of seven outpatient
visits, and surviving hospitalized patients had
two outpatient visits after discharge from the
hospital. Persons who received only outpatient
care were treated for 28 days with either oral
ciprofloxacin or doxycycline. No significant long-
term sequelae resulted from the primary
infection, and no relapses occurred.
The epidemic curve for brucellosis by days
after exposure was assumed to be 0 to 7 days, 4%
of cases; 8 to 14 days, 6%; 15 to 28 days, 14%; 29
to 56 days, 40%; 57 to 112 days, 26%, and 113 or
more days, 10% (4, 6-9). The case-fatality rate
was estimated to be 0.5%. Fifty percent of patients
were hospitalized, with an average stay of 7 days.
Nonhospitalized patients had an average of 14
outpatient visits, and hospitalized patients had
seven outpatient visits after discharge from the
hospital. Outpatients received a combination of
oral doxycycline for 42 days and parenteral genta-
micin for the first 7 days of therapy. Five percent
of patients had a relapse or long-term sequelae,
and required 14 outpatient visits within 1 year.
The epidemic curve for tularemia by days after
exposure was assumed to be: <1 day, 0% of cases;
1 day, 1%; 2 days, 15%; 3 days, 45%; 4 days, 25%;
5 days, 10%; 6 days, 3%; and 7 or more days, 1%
(4,10-11). The estimated case-fatality rate was
7.5%; and 95% of patients were hospitalized, with
an average stay of 10 days. Nonhospitalized
patients had an average of 12 outpatient visits,
and hospitalized patients who survived the acute
illness had two outpatient visits after discharge
from the hospital. Outpatients received oral doxy-
cycline for 14 days and parenteral gentamicin for 7
days. Five percent of patients had a relapse or
long-term sequelae and required an average of
12 outpatient visits.
The efficacy of intervention strategies is
unknown; our projections are our best estimates
based on published clinical and experimental data
(4,12-14). For anthrax, the projected intervention
program was either a 28-day course of oral cipro-
floxacin or doxycycline (assumed to be 90%
effective), or a 28-day course of oral ciprofloxacin
or doxycycline plus three doses of the human
anthrax vaccine (assumed to be 95% effective); for
brucellosis, a 42-day course of oral doxycycline
and rifampin (assumed to be 80% effective), or a
42-day course of oral doxycycline, plus 7 days of
parenteral gentamicin (assumed to be 95% effec-
tive); for tularemia, the intervention program
was a 14-day course of oral doxycycline (assumed
to be 80% effective), or a 14-day course of oral
doxycycline plus 7 days of parenteral gentamicin
(assumed to be 95% effective). Only 90% of persons
exposed in the target area were assumed to
effectively participate in any intervention pro-
gram. Because the target area cannot be
precisely defined, we estimated that for every
exposed person participating in the intervention
program, an additional 5, 10, or 15 nonexposed




To analyze the economic factors involved in
establishing an intervention program, we compared
the costs to the potential savings from such an
intervention. Following the recommendation of
the Panel of Cost-Effectiveness in Health and
Medicine (PCEHM), we used estimates of actual
costs rather than financial charges or market
prices, which usually incorporate profit (15). We
calculated the net savings (cost reductions) by
using the following formula:  Net savings =
(number of deaths averted x present value of
expected future earnings) + (number of days of
hospitalization averted x cost of hospitalization)
+ (number of outpatient visits averted x cost of
outpatient visits) - cost of intervention.
When we calculated the costs of hospi-
talization and outpatient visits, we assumed that
only persons with symptoms (i.e., case-patients)
would use medical facilities. The remainder of
the exposed and potentially exposed populace
would receive postexposure prophylaxis.
Present Value of Expected Future Earnings
The cost of a premature human death was
nominally valued at the present value of expected
future earnings and housekeeping services,
weighted by the age and sex composition of the
work force in the United States (16). The undis-
counted average of future earnings is $1,688,595.
As recommended by PCEHM (17), the stream of
future earnings was discounted at 3% and 5%, to
give values of $790,440 and $544,160, respectively.
The present value of expected future earnings
was estimated with 1990 dollars, adjusted for a 1%
annual growth in productivity (16). However, in
constant terms (1982 dollars), the average hourly
earnings in private industry fell from $7.52 in
1990 to $7.40 in 1994 (18); therefore, the estimate
of future earnings was not adjusted upwards.
Cost of Hospitalization
In 1993, the average charge for a single day of
hospitalization was $875 (19). To derive true cost,
we multiplied the average charge by the cost-to-
charge ratio of 0.635, (the April 1994 statewide
average cost-to-charge ratio for urban hospitals
in New York state) (16). On this basis, we esti-
mated true hospitalization costs at $556/day
(Table 1). Hospital costs included all professional
services, drugs, x-rays, and laboratory tests. Lost
productivity during hospital stay was valued at
$65/day (the value of an “unspecified” day’s
earnings, weighted for age and sex composition of
the U.S. work force) (16).
Cost of Posthospitalization
Outpatient Visits
After discharge from the hospital, a patient
was assumed to have follow-up outpatient visits,
the number of which varied by disease (Table 1).
Outpatient visit costs were valued by using the
Medicare National Average Allowance (20), which
was chosen to represent the equivalent of bulk
purchase discounted costs (i.e., actual costs)
(Table 1). The first visit has a Current Procedural
Terminology (CPT) code of 99201, which is clas-
sified as a “level 1” visit, requiring a physician to
spend an average of 10 minutes with a patient
(20). Subsequent level 1 visits, with the physician
spending an average of 5 minutes with each
patient, have a CPT code of 99211 (20). During
outpatient visits, a general health panel test
incorporating clinical chemistry tests and complete
blood counts (CPT code 80050) and a single
antigen or antibody detection test (e.g., CPT code
86558) were assumed to be ordered (20).
Although data on Medicare allowances for office
visits and many other procedures were available,
data on Medicare allowances for laboratory tests
were not. Thus, to establish the costs of the tests,
we arbitrarily divided the lowest allowable charge
for each test in half. X-rays (CPT code 71021)
were valued according to the Medicare National
Average Allowance (Table 1). In terms of lost
productivity, we assumed that each outpatient
visit cost the equivalent of 2 hours, or one-
quarter, of the value of an unspecified day (16).
Cost of Outpatient Visits
of Nonhospitalized Patients
For nonhospitalized outpatients, the cost of
each visit, laboratory test, x-ray, and lost pro-
ductivity was the same as an outpatient visit for
discharged hospital patients and varied by
disease (Table 1). We assumed that one set of
laboratory tests would be ordered every other
visit and that two sets of x-rays (CPT code 71021)
would be ordered during the therapeutic course.
Drug costs are discussed below.
Cost of an Intervention
The costs of an intervention can be expressed
as follows: Cost of intervention = (cost of drugs
used) x ([number of people exposed x multiplication86 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 2, April–June 1997
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factor] - number killed - number hospitalized -
number of persons who require outpatient visits).
The intervention costs per person depend
directly on the costs of the antimicrobial agents and
vaccines used in a prophylaxis program (Table 2).
We obtained drug prices from the 1996 Drug Topics
Red Book and used the lowest cost available for
each drug (21). The cost of doxycycline ($0.22 per
200 mg total daily dose) was the Health Care
Financing Administration cost, whereas the cost
of gentamicin ($3.76 per 160 mg total daily dose),
ciprofloxacin ($3.70 per 1,000 mg total daily dose),
and rifampin ($5.01 per 900 mg total daily
dose) were wholesale costs from pharmaceutical
companies. The cost of anthrax vaccine was $3.70
per dose (Helen Miller-Scott, pers. comm., 1996).
The cost of administering one vaccine dose or
gentamicin injection was estimated at $10.00, on
the basis of the 1992 cost of administering a vac-
cine in a clinical setting (Valerie Kokor, pers.
comm., 1996). In estimating the cost of administering
oral antimicrobial agents, we assumed weekly
visits, during which the drug would be distri-
buted and counseling would be given ($15.00 for
the first visit and $10.00 for each subsequent visit).
We assumed that more people would receive
prophylaxis than were actually exposed because
of general anxiety and uncertainty about the
boundaries of the attack, the timing of the attack,
and the time it would take nonresidents to travel
through the attack area. Three different multipli-
cation factors (5, 10, and 15) were used to construct
Table 1. Costs of hospitalization and outpatient visits (OPVs) following a bioterrorist attack
Anthrax Tularemia Brucellosis
Base Upper Base Upper Base Upper
Hospitalized patient
Days in hospital        7        7      10      10        7        7
Cost per day ($)a    556    669    556    669    556    669
Lost productivity ($/day)      65      65      65      65      65      65
Follow-up OPVs (no.)        2        2        2        2        7        7
Cost 1st OPV ($)      28      44      28      44      28      44
Cost other OPVs, ea. ($)      13      24      13      24      13      24
OPV laboratory ($)b,c      87    174      87    174    131    261
OPV x-rays costs ($)d      66      66        0        0        0        0
Lost productivity ($/OPV)e      16      16      16      16      16      16
Total costs ($) 4,541 5,380 6,338 7,582 4,584 5,587
Avg. costs/day ($/day)    649    769    634    758    655    798
% increase: Base to upper estimate    18     20     22
Nonhospitalized patient
Number of OPVs        7        7      12      12      14      14
Cost 1st OPV ($)      28      44      28      44      28      44
Cost other OPVs, ea. ($)      13      24      13      24      13      24
Lost productivity ($/OPV)e      16      16      16      16      16      16
Laboratory costs ($)b,f    131    174     261    522    261    522
X-ray costs ($)d      66      66      66      66     66      66
Drugs usedg       D        C   D+G D+G   D+R D+R+G
Cost of drugs ($)        6     181      29      29    220    246
Total costs ($)    422     810    722 1,120    972 1,418
Avg. costs/day ($/day)      60     116      60      93      69     101
% increase: Base to upper estimate      93     55     46
Notes: All costs rounded to the nearest whole dollar.
aHospital costs assumed to include all costs such as drugs, laboratory tests, and x-rays.
bLaboratory tests consists of general health panel (CPT code 80050) and an antigen or antibody test (modeled on the cost of a
Streptococcus screen, CPT code 86588).
cFollow-up OPVs for hospitalized patients included two laboratory test sets for anthrax and tularemia patients and three
laboratory test sets for brucellosis patients.
dX-ray costs (CPT code 71021), included two sets taken at different OPVs.
eProductivity lost due to an OPV was assumed to be one-quarter of an unspecified day’s value.
fFor OPVs of nonhospitalized patients, one set of laboratory tests is assumed for every two visits.
gDrugs used: D = doxycycline; C = ciprofloxacin; R = rifampin.
Sources: See text for explanation of sources of cost estimates.87 Vol. 3, No. 2, April–June 1997 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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alternative cost-of-intervention scenarios that
take into account persons who were not at risk
but participated in the prophylaxis program.
Thus, if 100,000 people were exposed, we
assumed that the maximum number seeking
prophylaxis was 500,000, 1,000,000, or 1,500,000.
Economic Analysis of
Preparedness: Insurance
The analyses outlined above consider only
the economics of an intervention after an attack
and include several assumptions:  First, stock-
piles of drugs, vaccines, and other medical
supplies would be available and could be rapidly
moved to points of need. Second, civil, military,
and other organizations would be in place and
have the capability to rapidly identify the agent,
dispense drugs, treat patients, and keep order
within the population. Finally, ongoing intelli-
gence gathering would detect possible bioterrorist
threats. The cost of these prerequisite activities
can be calculated if they are seen as a form of
insurance, the goal of which is to “purchase” the
maximum net savings through preparedness to
manage the consequences of an attack and reduce
the probability of an attack. The “actuarially fair
premium” for the “insurance” can be defined as
follows (22): Actuarially fair premium = reduction
of loss probability x value of avoidable loss.
The term “reduction of loss probability” indi-
cates that, although increased surveillance and
related activities can reduce the odds of an attack,
they cannot guarantee absolute protection. The
term “avoidable loss” refers to the fact that, even
if a postexposure prophylaxis program were
implemented on the day of release (day zero),
some deaths, hospitalizations, and outpatient
visits would be unavoidable.
Various reductions of attack probability illus-
trated the impact of these estimates on the cal-
culation of actuarially fair premiums. Such
reductions included reducing the probability from 1
in 100 years (0.01) to 1 in 1,000 years (0.001), a
reduction of 0.009, and reducing a probability
from 1 in a 100 years (0.01) to 1 in 10,000 years
(0.0001), and from 1 in 100 years (0.01) to 1 in
100,000 years (0.00001). The attack probability
of 0.01 in the absence of enhanced preventive
actions was selected for illustrative purposes and
does not represent an official estimate.
A range of minimum and maximum values of
avoidable loss was derived from the net savings
calculations. The values reflect differences in
effectiveness of the various prophylaxis regimens,
the reduced impact of delayed prophylaxis on
illness and death, and the two discount rates
used to calculate the present value of earnings
lost because of death.
Sensitivity Analyses
In addition to the scenarios discussed above,
three sensitivity analyses were conducted. First,
the impact of increasing the cost of hospitalization
and outpatient visits was assessed by using a set
of upper estimates (Table 1). The cost of a hos-
pital day was increased to $669 by increasing the
cost-to-charge ratio from 0.634 to 0.764 (the ratio
for Maryland) (16). The costs of outpatient visits
(first and follow-up) were increased by assuming
each visit was a “level 2” visit, doubling the average
time a physician spends with each patient. The
Table 2. Costs of prophylaxis following a bioterrorist attack
Level of
effectiveness Anthrax Tularemia Brucellosis
Lower
Effectiveness (%)            90            80           80
Drugs useda     D or C             D        D+R
Cost of drugs ($)b   6 or 181              3          220
No. of visitsc              4              2              6
Total cost/ 51 or 226            28          285
person ($)
Upper
Effectiveness (%)             95            95            95
Drugs useda     D+V or         D+G        D+G
      C+V
Cost of drugs ($)b  17 or 193             29            36
No. of visitsc               4               7            12
Total cost/  62 or 238           104           161
person ($)
Minimum No.    451,912    418,094    423,440
participantsd
Maximum No. 1,492,750 1,488,037 1,488,037
participantse
Notes: All costs are rounded to the nearest whole dollar.
aDrugs used: D = doxycycline; C = ciprofloxacin; V = anthrax
vaccine; G = gentamicin; R = rifampin.
bSee text for explanation of drug costs.
cCost of visit to drug-dispensing site: 1st visit = $15/person;
follow-up visits = $10/person/visit.
dEstimate assumed that the prophylaxis program was initiated
on postattack day 6 for anthrax and tularemia and postattack
day 113 for brucellosis, that the prophylaxis program had the
lower effectiveness level, and that the multiplication factor for
unnecessary prophylaxis givn to unexposed persons was 5.
eEstimate assumed that prophylaxis was initiated on
postattack day 0 (day of release), that prophylaxis had the
upper effectiveness level, and that the multiplication factor for
unnecessary prophylaxis given to unexposed persons was 15.88 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 2, April–June 1997
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costs of laboratory tests were increased to the full
amount of the allowable charge (20).
The second sensitivity analysis considered a
reduced impact, in which only 10% of the original
100,000 target population were considered exposed.
All other estimates were held constant. The third
sensitivity analysis considered the threshold cost
of an intervention, given differences due to the
effectiveness of various drug regimens, and
discount rates used to calculate the present value
of expected lifetime earnings lost to a death. The
threshold cost occurs when net savings equal $0.
Thus, the threshold value represents the
maximum that could be spent per person on an
intervention without having the intervention
cost more than the loss from no intervention.
Findings
Postattack Illness and Death
In our model, all three biologic agents would
cause high rates of illness and death. In the
absence of an intervention program for the
100,000 persons exposed, the B. anthracis cloud
would result in 50,000 cases of inhalation anthrax,
with 32,875 deaths; the F. tularensis cloud in
82,500 cases of pneumonic or typhoidal tularemia,
with 6,188 deaths; and the B. melitensis cloud in
82,500 cases of brucellosis requiring extended
therapy, with 413 deaths.
The speed with which a postattack inter-
vention program can be effectively implemented
is critical to its success (Figure 1). For diseases
with short incubation periods such as anthrax
and tularemia, a prophylaxis program must be
instituted within 72 hours of exposure to prevent
the maximum number of deaths, hospital days,
and outpatient visits (Figure 1). Some benefit,
however, can be obtained even if prophylaxis is
begun as late as day 6 after exposure. The
relative clinical efficacy of the intervention
regimen has a lesser but definite impact on
observed illness and death rates (Figure 1).
A disease with a long incubation period such
as brucellosis has a similar pattern (Figure 1); an
important difference is the time available to
implement an intervention program. Having
more time available to implement an intervention
program can make a marked difference in its
effectiveness. However, the prolonged incubation
period creates a greater potential for panic in
potentially exposed persons because of the
uncertainty about their health status.
Economic Analyses of Postattack Intervention:
No Program
Without a postexposure prophylaxis program,
an attack with B. anthracis is far costlier than
attacks with F. tularensis or B. melitensis (Table 3).
The differences between agents in medical costs
as a percentage of total estimated costs are due to
the large differences in death rates attributed to
each agent (Figure 1).
Net Savings Due to a Postexposure
Prophylaxis Program
 If the postexposure prophylaxis program is
initiated early, it reduces the economic impact of
all three diseases, especially anthrax (Figure 2).
Regardless of drug costs, the largest cost reductions
Table 3. Costsa ($ millions) of a bioterrorist attack with





Hospital      194.1    445.8 170.3
OPVc          2.0      10.5   48.9
Medical: Upper
estimatesd
Hospital      237.1    543.3 211.7
OPVc          4.4      18.5   78.3
Lost productivity
Illnesse
Hospital        21.6      50.9   18.8
OPVc          0.7        3.9   15.0
Death
3% discountf 25,985.7 4,891.2 326.5
5% discountf 17,889.3 3,367.3 224.7
Total costs
Base estimates
3% discountf 26,204.1 5,402.4 579.4
5% discountf 18,107.7 3,878.4 477.7
Upper estimates
3% discountf 26,249.7 5,507.9 650.1
5% discountf 18,153.1 3,983.9 548.4
aAssuming 100,000 exposed.
bMedical costs are the costs of hospitalization (which include
follow-up outpatient visits) and outpatient visits (Table 1).
cOPV = outpatient visits.
dUpper estimates calculated with data in Table 1.
eLost productivity due to illness is the value of time spent in
hospital and during OPVs (Table 1).
fDiscount rate applied to calculate the present value of expected
future earnings and housekeeping services, weighted by age
and sex composition of the United States workforce (16), lost
due to premature death.89 Vol. 3, No. 2, April–June 1997 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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Figure 1. Total deaths, hospital days, and outpatient visits associated with aerosol releases of B. anthracis, B.
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$10.7 to $115.1 million occurred when a post-
exposure program was delayed until day 6 after
exposure, and a prophylaxis regimen of doxy-
cycline and gentamicin (estimated 95% efficacy)
was used. For the same scenario, but with a 3%
discount, a net savings of $1,513.3 million was
observed when a multiplication factor of five for
unnecessary prophylaxis was used. However,
multiplication factors of 10 and 15 generated net
losses of $49.8 and $102.0 million, respectively.
With the same drug combination, beginning the
program 1 day earlier (day 5 after exposure)
resulted in net savings in all scenarios except
when a multiplication factor of 15 and a discount
rate of 5% were used. Under the latter two
assumptions, net savings result only for pro-
phylaxis initiated by day 4 after exposure.
In the case of brucellosis, the use of a
doxycycline-rifampin regimen (estimated 80% effi-
cacy), a multiplication factor of 15 for unnecessary
prophylaxis, and a discount rate of either 3% or
5% generated net losses regardless of when
intervention began (Figure 2). The doxycycline-
gentamicin regimen (estimated 95% efficacy)
Figure 2. Rangesa of net savings due to postattack prophylaxis by disease and day of prophylaxis program initiation.
aMaximum savings (l) were calculated by assuming a 95% effectiveness prophylaxis regimen and a 3% discount rate in determining
the present value of expected lifetime earnings lost due to premature death (16) and a multiplication factor of 5 to adjust for
unnecessary prophylaxis. Minimum savings (n) were calculated by assuming an 80% to 90% effectiveness regimen and a 5% discount
rate and a multiplication factor of 15. In tularemia prophylaxis programs initiated on days 4-7 postattack, the minimum savings were
calculated by assuming a 95% prophylaxis regimen effectiveness rather than an effectiveness of 80% to 90%.
are obtained through a combination of the most
effective prophylaxis regimen (i.e., 95% effective,
Table 2), the smallest multiplication factor to adjust
for persons who unnecessarily receive prophylaxis,
and a 3% discount rate to calculate the present
value of the expected value of lifetime earnings.
In the case of anthrax, either doxycycline or
ciprofloxacin could be used in the intervention pro-
gram (Table 2), but the use of doxycycline
generated the largest savings. The largest dif-
ference in net savings between the two drugs was
approximately $261.6 million. This difference
occurred when it was assumed that the program
began on day zero (day of release), each drug was
used in combination with the anthrax vaccine, a
3% discount rate was used, and a multiplication
factor of 15 for unnecessary prophylaxis was used.
This amount is equal to approximately 1.2% of
the maximum total net savings generated by using
a regimen of doxycycline plus the anthrax vaccine.
Some scenarios, particularly those in which
prophylaxis programs were started late, generated
negative net savings (i.e., net losses). In the case
of tularemia, at a 5% discount rate, net losses of
generated net losses only when
it was assumed that the start of
a program was delayed until 113
or more days after exposure.
Preparedness: Insurance
The annual actuarially fair
premium that can be justifiably
spent on intelligence gathering
and other attack prevention
measures increases with the
probability that a bioterrorist
attack can be decreased by such
measures (Table 4). However,
the potential net savings attri-
buted to reduced probability are
minor compared with the poten-
tial net savings from imple-
menting a prophylaxis program.
Depending on the level of
protection that can be achieved,
the annual actuarially fair pre-91 Vol. 3, No. 2, April–June 1997 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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mium in an anthrax scenario would be $3.2
million to $223.5 million (Table 4). The lower pre-
mium would be justifiable for measures that could
reduce the risk for an attack from 0.01 to 0.001
and provide the ability to mount an intervention
program within 6 days of the attack. The higher
premium would be justifiable for measures that
could reduce the risk from 0.01 to 0.00001 and allow
immediate intervention if an attack occurred.
Sensitivity Analyses
The upper estimates of the cost of hospitali-
zation increased average costs per day by 18% to
22%, and upper estimates of the cost of outpatient
visits increased average costs per day by 46% to
93% (Table 1). However, the upper estimates only
increased medical costs by 1% to 6% of the total
medical costs associated with a bioterrorist attack
(Table 3). The largest increase was for brucellosis,
for which upper estimates increased medical costs
from 38% to 44% of total costs (Table 3).
When the number of persons infected during
an attack was reduced tenfold, the patient-related
costs were reduced proportionately (Table 3). In
most cases, however, the net savings in total
costs are less than 10% of the net savings when
100% of the target population was presumed
infected. The shortfall in savings is caused by an
increase in the number of unexposed persons
receiving prophylaxis. In the case of anthrax,
when intervention programs are initiated within
3 days of exposure, savings are 4.1% to 10% of
those in the original scenario (Figure 2). Delaying
initiation of prophylaxis until days 4, 5, or 6 after
exposure, however, results in net losses of $13.4
to $283.1 million. Losses occur regardless of
prophylaxis regimen, discount rate, or multi-
plication factor used to adjust for unnecessary
prophylaxis by unexposed persons.
In scenarios in which a multiplication factor
of 15 was used to adjust for unnecessary pro-
phylaxis, the threshold value of intervention was
always above the prophylaxis cost for anthrax
but not above the prophylaxis costs for tularemia
and brucellosis (Table 5). For tularemia, the
threshold intervention costs exceeded disease costs
up to day 5 in the scenario with 95% effectiveness
and a 5% discount, and for brucellosis, at all
levels in the scenarios with 80% effectiveness and
up to day 56 in the scenarios with 95% effec-
tiveness. This is consistent with the lower range
of estimated net savings (net losses) given in
Figure 2. Reducing the number of unexposed
persons receiving prophylaxis increases the cost
thresholds, making the program cost beneficial.
For example, changing the multiplication factors
for unnecessary prophylaxis to 5 and 10 increases
the cost thresholds to $659 and $319, respectively,
for a brucellosis prophylaxis program initiated 15
to 28 days after exposure, with a 5% discount
rate. If a discount rate of 3% is used instead of 5%,
the cost thresholds increase to $799 and $387. All
these cost thresholds are above the estimated
prophylaxis cost of $285 per person for the doxy-
cycline-rifampin regimen and $161 per person for
the doxycycline-gentamicin regimen (Table 2).
Conclusions
The economic impact of a bioterrorist attack
can range from $477.7 million per 100,000
persons exposed in the brucellosis scenario to
$26.2 billion per 100,000 persons exposed in the
anthrax scenario (Table 3). These are minimum
Table 4. The maximum annual actuarially fair premiuma




 Days Preventable    0.01  0.01 0.01
post-      loss    to    to  to
attackb ($millions) 0.001 0.0001  0.00001
Maximum loss estimatec
0 22,370.5 201.3 221.5 223.5
1 20,129.4 181.2 199.3 201.1
2 15,881.5 142.9 157.2 158.7
3   8,448.0   76.0   83.6   84.4
4   4,200.1   37.8   41.6   42.0
5   2,076.1   18.7   20.6   20.7
6   1,013.8   9.1   10.0   10.1
Minimum loss estimated
0 14,372.4 128.9 141.8 143.1
1 12,820.1 115.4 126.9 128.1
2 10,049.1   90.4   99.5 100.4
3   5,200.1   46.8   51.5   51.9
4   2,429.7   21.9   24.1   24.3
5   1,004.2     9.4   10.3   10.4
6      351.2     3.2     3.5     3.5
aSee text for definition.
bNo. of days from attack to effective initiation of prophylaxis.
cMaximum loss preventable (potential net savings) occurs
with the doxycycline-anthrax vaccine prophylaxis regimen, a
multiplication factor of 5 for unnecessary prophylaxis, and a
discount rate of 3% (Table 2).
dMinimum loss preventable (potential net savings) occurs
with the ciprofloxacin prophylaxis regimen, a multiplication
factor of 15 for unnecessary prophylaxis, and a discount rate
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estimates. In our analyses, we consistently used
low estimates for all factors directly affecting
costs. The ID50 estimates for the three agents are
twofold to 50-fold higher than previously published
estimates (5,6,10,11), resulting in a possible under-
statement of attack rates. Also, in our analyses
we did not include a number of other factors (e.g.,
long-term human illness or animal illnesses)
(Table 6) whose cumulative effect would likely
increase the economic impact of an attack.
Our model shows that early implementation
of a prophylaxis program after an attack is essen-
tial. Although the savings achieved by initiating
a prophylaxis program on any given day after
exposure has a wide range, a clear trend of
markedly reduced savings is associated with delay
in starting prophylaxis (Figure 2). This trend was
found in the analysis of all three agents studied.
Delay in starting a prophylaxis program is
the single most important factor for increased
losses (reduced net savings). This observation
was supported by the actuarially fair premium
for preparedness analysis (Table 4). Reductions
in preventable loss due to early intervention had
significantly greater impact on the amount of an
actuarially fair premium than reductions in
probability of an attack through intelligence
gathering and related activities.
Although implemented at different times in a
threat-attack continuum, both attack prevention
measures and prophylaxis programs are forms of
preventive medicine. Attack prevention measures
seek to prevent infection, while prophylaxis pro-
grams prevent disease after infection has occurred.
Using an actuarially fair premium analogy in
which cost and benefit are required to be equal,
we find that the incremental rate of increasing
prevention effectiveness (the marginal increase)
declines rapidly as probability reduction targets
go from 0.001 to 0.0001 to 0.00001. Because the
loss probability is decreasing on a logarithmic scale,
the potential increment in marginal benefit drops
comparably, resulting in ever smaller increments
in the protection above the preceding base level.
Conversely, delaying a prophylaxis program
for anthrax, a disease with a short incubation
Table 5. Cost thresholdsa of interventions ($/person) by day of intervention initiation, prophylaxis effectiveness, and discount
rates.
Threshold costs for intervention ($/person, multiplication factor of 15b)
Anthrax Tularemia Brucellosis
Post- Post- Post-
attack Disc. ratec attack Disc. rate attack Disc. rate
dayd 5% 3% day 5% 3% day 5% 3%
90% effectivenesse 80% effectivenesse 80% effectivenesse
 0 9,838 14,238 0 1,891 2,633       0-7 233* 282*
 1 8,851 12,809 1 1,873 2,609     8-14 224* 272*
 2 7,022 10,162 2 1,599 2,227   15-28 211* 255*
 3 3,775   5,463 3    756 1,053   29-56 179* 217*
 4 1,893   2,739 4    258    366 57-112   86* 104*
 5    944   1,366 5      79    110      113+   24*   30*
 6    468      677 6      20*      28
Prophylaxis costc  $226   $28              $285
95% effectivenesse 95% effectivenesse 95% effectivenesse
 0 10,370 15,007 0 2,229 3,104       0-7 274 333
 1   9,359 13,544 1 2,207 3,074     8-14 264 320
 2   7,427 10,948 2 1,898 2,644   15-28 248 301
 3   3,995   5,782 3    898 1,251   29-56 211 256
 4   2,004   2,900 4    328    457 57-112 102* 124*
 5   1,000   1,447 5      93*    131      113+   29*   35*
 6      496     718 6      23*      32*
Prophylaxis coste  $238 $104             $161
*Threshold value is below estimated cost of prophylaxis.
aCost threshold is the point where cost of intervention and net savings due to the intervention are equal.
bMultiplication factor to adjust for persons who participated in the prophylaxis program but were unexposed.
cApplied to present value of expected future earnings and housekeeping services (weighted average for age and sex).
dPostattack day on which  prophylaxis was effecively implemented.
eSee Table 2 for prophylaxis regimens assumed to give the stated levels of effectiveness and cost/person of prophylaxis.93 Vol. 3, No. 2, April–June 1997 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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period and a high death rate, increases the risk
for loss in a manner akin to a semilogarithmic
scale. Arithmetic increases in response time buy
disproportionate increases in benefit (prevented
losses.) The potential for reducing loss is great
because an attack is assumed, thus increasing
the actuarially fair premium available to prepare
for and implement a rapid response.
Large differences between prophylaxis costs
and the threshold costs for most scenarios, par-
ticularly if prophylaxis is early (Table 5), suggest
that the estimates of savings from prophylaxis pro-
grams are robust. Even with large increases in pro-
phylaxis cost, net savings would still be achieved.
The ability to rapidly identify persons at risk
would also have significant impact on costs. For
example, the threshold costs for brucellosis
prophylaxis are often lower than intervention
costs when the ratio of unexposed to exposed
persons in the prophylaxis program is 15:1 (Table
5). This finding provides an economic rationale
for preparedness to rapidly and accurately
identify the population at risk and reduce
unnecessary prophylaxis costs.
The maximum amount of the annual actu-
arially fair premium varies directly with the level
of risk reduction and the rapidity of postattack
response (Table 4). The calculated amount of
actuarially fair premiums, however, should be
considered a lower bound estimate. A higher esti-
mate (called the certainty equivalent) can also be
calculated; however, this requires the deter-
mination of a social welfare function (22), and
such complexity is beyond the scope of this study.
Our model provides an economic rationale for
preparedness measures to both reduce the proba-
bility of an attack and increase the capability to
rapidly respond in the event of an attack. The larger
portion of this preparedness budget (insurance
premium) should be allocated to measures that
enhance rapid response to an attack. These
measures would include developing and maintaining
laboratory capabilities for both clinical diagnostic
testing and environmental sampling, developing
and maintaining drug stockpiles, and developing
and practicing response plans at the local level.
These measures should be developed with a value-
added approach. For example, the laboratory capa-
bility could be used for other public health
activities in addition to preparedness, and drugs
nearing their potency expiration date could be
used in government-funded health care programs.
However, these secondary uses should not under-
mine the preparedness program’s effectiveness.
Arnold Kaufmann is a retired Public Health Service
officer, formerly assigned to the National Center for
Infectious Diseases.
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